Abstract. Reliable communication between processors in a network is a basic requirement for executing any protocol. Dolev [7] and Dolev et al. [8] showed that reliable communication is possible if and only if the communication network is sufficiently connected. Beimel and Franklin [1] showed that the connectivity requirement can be relaxed if some pairs of processors share authentication keys. That is, costly communication channels can be replaced by authentication keys.
Introduction
Suppose that some processors are connected by an incomplete synchronous network of reliable channels. The processors cooperate to execute some protocol, but some of them are maliciously faulty. Dolev [7] and Dolev et al. [8] proved that if there are t faulty processors, then every pair of processors can communicate reliably if and only if the network is (2t + 1)-connected. Beimel and Franklin [1] showed that the connectivity requirement can be relaxed if some pairs of processors share authentication keys. That is, costly communication channels can be replaced by authentication keys.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [2] .
In this paper we consider the problem of "single-pair" reliable communication in partially authenticated, synchronous networks. In this problem there is a specific sender a who wants to send a message to a specific receiver b, such that any coalition of at most t faulty processors cannot prevent this transmission. The communication channels in the network define a natural "communication graph," with an edge between two vertices for every channel between two processors. The pairs of processors sharing authentication keys define a natural "authentication graph," with an edge between two vertices for every shared key. The partially authenticated network, which is the union of the two graphs, is given and known to all of the processors. To enable reliable communication from a to b there must be at least t + 1 disjoint paths from a to b in the communication graph (otherwise, there are t vertices that can fail-stop, disconnecting a from b). If a and b share an authentication key and there are t + 1 disjoint communication paths from a to b, then reliable communication from a to b is possible and efficient. But what if a and b do not share an authentication key? We do not want to give a new key to a and b, because distributing and maintaining these keys is expensive. Our goal is to achieve reliable communication from a to b using the existing communication and authentication capabilities of the two graphs.
Beimel and Franklin [1] characterize when reliable communication is possible using these two graphs. Their characterization depends on recursively defined graphs which include all of the edges of the communication graph and some of the edges of the authentication graph. However, the reliable protocol presented by Beimel and Franklin [1] is inefficient; it requires n O(n) rounds, where n is the number of processors in the network. In this paper we present a more efficient protocol obtained by exploiting the properties of the graphs that characterize reliable communication.
Historical notes. The connectivity requirements for several distributed tasks in several models has been studied in many papers; for example, Byzantine agreement [7, 11] , approximate Byzantine agreement [9, 24] , reliable message transmission [7, 8] , and reliable and private message transmission [19, 8, 21, 23] . Simple impossibility results and references can be found in [11, 18] . We mention that in Byzantine agreement all honest processors should agree on the same message while in reliable communication only the sender and the receiver agree on the message. Beimel and Franklin [1] considered the connectivity requirements in partially authenticated networks. In addition to the "single-pair" version of the problem, they characterize when reliable transmission is possible in the "all-pairs" version. In this version any sender should be able to reliably transmit a message to any receiver, such that any coalition of at most t faulty processors cannot prevent this transmission. Sayeed and Abu-Amara [20] gave a secure message transmission protocol for asynchronous networks. Kumar et al. [17] studied the secure message transmission problem in the non-threshold setting. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [14] , Franklin and Yung [13] , Franklin and Wright [12] , and Wang and Desmedt [5] studied secure communication and secure computation in multi-recipient (multi-cast) models. Wang and Desmedt [6] studied secure computation in directed networks. Bläser et al. [3] characterize the Boolean functions that can be securely computed in non-2-connected networks.
Our results. Our main result is a more efficient protocol for "single-pair" reliable communication. The round complexity of our protocol is (n/t) O(t) , where n is the number of processors in the network and t is an upper bound on the number of Byzantine processors in the network. Specifically, our protocol is polynomial when the number of Byzantine processors is O (1) , and for every t its round complexity is bounded by 2 O(n) . The improved protocol is obtained by analyzing the properties of the graphs that characterize reliable communication. We exploit these properties to obtain a protocol with better round complexity than the protocol of [1] . It remains open whether there is a reliable message transmission protocol with polynomial number of rounds for t = ω (1) .
Our improved protocol for reliable communication implies, using a transformation of [12, 1] , an improved protocol for reliable and private communication, that is, a protocol in which a message is reliably transmitted and the adversary learns nothing about it (other than the information that a message is being transmitted). Hence, we obtain a protocol for reliable and private communication with round complexity (n/t) O(t) . We also give a simple characterization for reliable communication against one Byzantine processor. In this case a simple necessary condition for reliable communication is that the communication graph is 2-connected between a and b and the union of the communication and authentication graphs is 3-connected between a and b. We show that this condition is sufficient when the communication graph is connected. This characterization implies that reliable communication is symmetric for t = 1. However, we show that the natural generalization of this condition to t ≥ 2 is not sufficient. Finally, we show that reliable communication is not symmetric for t ≥ 2. That is, there is a partially authenticated network (i.e., a combination of a communication graph and an authentication graph) for which reliable communication is possible from a to b, but is not possible from b to a. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive as the edges are bi-directional.
Organization. In Sect. 2, we describe our model, review relevant results from [1] , and describe a simplified protocol SimpleSend. In Sect. 3, we study the properties of the "useful communication graph." In Sect. 4, we use these properties to prove that Protocol SimpleSend is efficient. In Sect. 5, we show how Protocol SimpleSend can be transformed to a protocol that achieves fault-restricted reliable communication, and, in Sect. 6 , we show how to use the fault-restricted protocol to achieve private and reliable communication. In Sect. 7, we discuss the symmetry/asymmetry of reliable communication. Finally, in Sect. 8, we present some concluding remarks and open problems.
Preliminaries

The model
In this work we consider a synchronous network in which the communication channels are assumed to be reliable. Specifically, the network is modeled by an undirected graph G C = V, E C , where V is the set of processors in the network (i.e., |V | = n), and E C describes the communication channels. That is, there is an edge u, v in E C if and only if there is a communication channel between u and v. We assume that these communication channels are reliable: an adversary that does not control u or v (but may control other vertices in the network) cannot change or delete a message sent on the edge u, v or insert a message on the channel. (In Sect. 6 we assume that these channels are also private.) Some pairs of processors share authentication keys. Informally, an authentication scheme enables a sender and a receiver who share a common key to exchange messages such that the receiver can verify that the message was sent by the sender (see Sect. 2.2 for more details). We describe which pairs of processors share a common authentication key by a graph G A = V, E A , in which u and v share a common key, denoted by k u,v , if and only if u, v ∈ E A . These keys are chosen according to some known probability distribution, and every set of vertices (processors) has no information on the keys of disjoint edges (pairs of processors), except for their a priori probability distribution. A partially authenticated network is a triplet N = V, E C , E A , where G C = V, E C is the communication graph and G A = V, E A is the authentication graph.
We consider protocols for message transmission, in which a sender a ∈ V wants to transmit a message M to a receiver b ∈ V in a partially authenticated, synchronous network. There is a global clock in the system and the protocol proceeds in rounds. That is, at the beginning of each round each processor v ∈ V sends messages to some of its neighbors in the graph G C . These messages get to the neighbors before the beginning of the next round. Furthermore, each processor knows when a round starts and what messages it got from its neighbors in the previous round (and which neighbors did not send a message). The round complexity of a protocol is the maximum number of rounds that elapsed from its activation to its termination. The message complexity of a protocol is the total number of bits in messages exchanged in a round by the non-Byzantine processors, maximized over all of the rounds.
Assumptions. We assume that all processors in the system know the topology of the partially authenticated network V, E C , E A . Furthermore, all the processors in the system know in which round processor a starts to transmit a message to processor b.
Attack model. During the execution of a protocol there might be Byzantine faults (also known as "active attacks"). An adversary, with unlimited power, controls a subset T of the processors. The adversary knows the protocol, the distribution under which the authentication keys where chosen, and the topology of the network (i.e., G C and G A ). For every processor in T , the adversary knows all the messages received by that processor, its random inputs, and its keys. The adversary can choose T adaptively during the execution of the protocol. From the moment a processor is included into T , the adversary determines the messages this processor sends thereafter (possibly deviating from the protocol specification in an arbitrary manner). Once a processor joins the set T of Byzantine processors, it cannot be excluded from T .
Definition 1 ((t, )-reliable communication).
Let N be a partially authenticated network, a ∈ V be a sender, and b ∈ V be receiver. A message transmission protocol from a to b in N is (t, )-reliable if for every message M transmitted from a to b by the protocol, when the adversary can control any set T of at most t processors such that T ⊆ V \ {a, b}, the probability that b accepts the message M is at least 1 − , where the probability is over the random inputs of the processors, the distribution of the authentication keys, and the random input of the adversary.
In this paper we consider fault-restricted reliable communication. We emphasize that fault-restricted reliable communication is a tool for characterizing when t-reliable transmission between a given pair of processors is possible. Furthermore, our protocol for t-reliable transmission uses a fault-restricted reliable transmission protocol as a sub-protocol. In the faultrestricted version at least one of two given sets T 0 , T 1 , which are not necessarily disjoint, is guaranteed to contain all of the faulty processors. We use the term suspected vertex for a vertex from T 0 ∪ T 1 , that is-a vertex that is possibly Byzantine. The reliability of a network is closely related to its connectivity. We consider vertex connectivity of undirected graphs. Two paths from a to b are vertex disjoint if no vertices other than a and b appear on both paths. A path P passes through a set T if there is a vertex u ∈ T in the path. Otherwise, we say that P avoids T or P is T -avoiding.
Definition 2 (({T
There is an efficient algorithm that checks whether a graph is (t, u, v)-connected (see, e.g., [10] ).
Authentication schemes
We briefly describe authentication schemes; the reader is referred to, e.g., [22] for more details. Let s be a positive integer and K be a finite set, called the set of keys. An authentication scheme for messages in {0, 1}
s is a pair auth, µ , where
* is a function and µ is a probability distribution on the set of keys K. An authentication scheme auth, µ can be used to send messages between two processors, which we call Alice and Bob, in the following way: in the initialization stage, Alice and Bob are given a shared secret key k ∈ K chosen from the probability distribution µ. To send an authenticated message M to Bob, Alice computes α = auth(M, k), called a tag, and sends the pair M, α to Bob. When Bob receives a pair M , α , he verifies that α = auth(M , k), in which case Bob accepts the message M . Informally, the scheme is -secure if the probability that an adversary can cause Bob to accept a message that was not sent by Alice is at most .
We use the notion of an -adversary in the following definition. Let auth, µ be an authentication scheme, and let k ∈ K be a key chosen from the probability distribution µ. An -adversary is a computationally unlimited adversary who does not know k, but can get tags α i = auth(M i , k) of messages of its choice. The adversary can choose these messages adaptively. That is, its strategy has, without loss of generality, stages; in the ith stage the adversary chooses a message M i which may depend on the previous messages and tags, and the adversary gets the tag α i = auth(M i , k). If anadversary can produce a pair M, α for which M = M i for every 0 ≤ i ≤ and α = auth(M, k), then the -adversary breaks the scheme, and the pair M, α is a forgery. ( , )-authentication scheme) . The scheme auth, µ is an ( , )-authentication scheme if anyadversary cannot break the scheme with probability greater than , where the probability is over the distribution of the authentication keys and the random input of the adversary.
Definition 3 (An
Authentication schemes based on hash functions were presented in [4, 25] . Efficient authentication schemes were presented by Krawczyk [15, 16] . In these schemes, for every message of length s there is an ( , )-authentication scheme with keys of length O( · log 1 + log s) and tags of length O(log( 1 )). 1 Note that the length of the tag is independent of the length of the message. We use these schemes throughout the paper. Remark. Our definitions of reliable communication and authentication schemes consider an adversary with unlimited computational ability. An alternative approach is to consider a polynomial-time adversary and to require that it cannot break the protocol/scheme in polynomial time. Breaking our reliable protocol implies breaking the underlying authentication scheme. Hence, if we use authentication schemes that are secure against polynomial-time adversaries, then the resulting reliable communication protocol is computationally secure (i.e., secure against polynomial-time adversaries).
Simple examples of our protocol
To illustrate some of the ideas used in our protocol for faultrestricted reliable communication, we first consider a simple example. Let N 0 be the partially authenticated network described in Fig. 1 . 2 In this network, a wants to send a message to b, and both know that at most one of t 0 , t 1 is Byzantine. If a shared an authentication key with b, then it could use it to send the authenticated message along the paths a, t 0 , b and a, t 1 , b . The authenticated message would then arrive on at least one of these paths, and b would verify its authenticity using the shared key. As we assume that the adversary cannot forge authenticated messages sent by the honest processors, b accepts the message sent by a.
However, a and b do not share an authentication key in N 0 . Instead, a sends the message M to b on the three paths a, t 0 , b , a, t 1 , b , and a, w, b . Transmission on a, w, b is done as follows: a authenticates M using the shared key k a,w and sends the authenticated message to w on the path a, t 1 , w . If w receives a valid authenticated message M from a, it uses the shared key k w,b to authenticate M and the authenticated message is sent to b on the path w, t 1 , b ; otherwise, w sends nothing. If b receives a valid authenticated message from w, it accepts it. Otherwise, b deduces that t 1 corrupted the transmission on either a, t 1 , w or w, t 1 , b ; thus t 0 is honest and therefore b accepts the message that arrived on a, t 0 , b . Notice that the processors use the fact that the network is synchronous only to determine when a message should arrive.
In the protocol for reliable transmission in N 0 , for every authentication edge, a path in the communication graph was used to send the authenticated message from one side of the edge to its other side. Let us see what happens if we apply this idea to N 1 , described in Fig. 1 To solve this problem, let us reconsider the transmission of M on the path P a,b . We use a sub-protocol with 8 rounds to achieve this goal. After this sub-protocol, either b receives the authentic message M or b can detect the Byzantine vertex. We first describe the sub-protocol round by round, and then try to abstract its components. In Rounds 1 and 2, we "send" the message on the authentication edge a, u using the path a, t 0 , u . In Rounds 3-6, we "send" the message on the authentication edge u, v using the path u, t 0 , b, v . The authentication edge b, v appears in this path, and in Rounds 5 and 6 we "send" the message on the authentication edge b, v using the path b, t 1 , v . Finally, in Rounds 7 and 8, we "send" the message on the authentication edge v, b using the path u, t 1 , b . Each time we need to "send" the message on an authentication edge, we choose a path that avoids at least one of t 0 , t 1 , and send the message, together with its appropriate authentication, on this path. Thus, if the message arrives without the valid authentication we can detect the Byzantine vertex.
Our general protocol follows the same ideas used for N 1 . That is, to "send" a message on an authentication edge u, v , an authenticated message is sent from u to v by propagating the message over a path that avoids at least one of the sets T 0 , T 1 . This way, if the message arrives with invalid authentication, the Byzantine set is detected. This path can contain additional authentication edges and the same idea is used recursively. In this process, we handle two problems. First, we make sure that this recursion is not applied infinitely. Second, we use an appropriate alert mechanism to ensure that the receiver b detects a set T i that contains all Byzantine vertices.
Characterizing fault-restricted reliable communication
In this section we quote the definitions of G * and confusing pairs from [1] . These definitions characterize when a can (T 0 , T 1 )-reliably transmit a message to b. We also use them extensively to describe our protocols. Whereas the above definition can be applied to any graph, the next definitions apply only to partially authenticated networks. To motivate the next definition consider an authentication edge u, v with a T i -avoiding path from u to v in G C , and an honest path from v to b in G C . When u wants to send a message M to v, it authenticates M using the shared key k u,v and then sends the authenticated message along the T iavoiding path from u to v. If the message does not arrive at v when it is supposed to or if it arrives with invalid authentication, then v immediately knows that the set T i is controlled by the adversary. Furthermore, v can share this information with b using the honest path from v to b. This makes the edge u, v useful. The following definition formalizes the idea of useful edges and how new useful edges can be added iteratively.
Definition 4 (Honest and avoiding paths). Let G = V, E
Definition 5 (Graphs G j and Graph G * ). Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network, a be the sender, b be the receiver, and T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} be a pair of sets. We inductively define a sequence of graphs
with the set of all authentication edges u, v ∈ E A for which all of the following properties hold:
There is an avoiding path from u to v in
and 3. There is an honest path in
Informally, the graph G * is the useful communication graph, as it contains exactly the edges that are used for reliably transmitting a message from a to b. That is, given a partially authenticated network N = V, E C , E A , our protocols only use the communication graph V, E C and the authentication keys k u,v of authentication edges u, v ∈ G * . During the execution of our protocols, Property (2) ensures that v learns the Byzantine set if an invalid message arrives from u, and Property (3) ensures that it can tell b about it. Also, as E A is finite, there is a k for which
Remark. Property (3) in Definition 5 implies that the topology of the graph G * depends on the receiver b. Thus, changing the receiver may change the topology of G * , a fact that we use in Sect. 7 to show that reliable communication is asymmetric. Observation 1. Authenticating a message M over an authentication edge e = u, v ∈ E A is not necessary if there is an honest path from u to v in G C . In such a case, M is reliably transmitted over this path, and e can be discarded. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that there are no such edges in E A .
We next define the notion of level of an edge, which is the stage in which it joins G * . As we will see, our protocols send messages over edges of level i by using edges of level at most i − 1. Thus, the higher the level of an edge, the more rounds it takes to send a message over that edge.
Definition 6 (Level of edges and paths).
Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network, a be the sender, b be the receiver, and
Note that e is a communication edge if and only if it has level 0. Obviously, a path has level 0 if and only if it is a path in G C . Also, for every authentication edge e = u, v with level(e) = j, there is an honest path from either u or v to b of level at most j − 1. Therefore, if there is an honest path P v,b from v to b of level at most j − 1, then the path
is the concatenation of the edge u, v and the path P v,b ) is an honest path from u to b of level at most j. We conclude that in G * there are honest paths from both u and v to b of level at most j.
We use N 1 described in Fig. 1 to demonstrate these definitions. In this network we have v, b ∈ E 1 since v, t 1 , b is an avoiding path from v to b in G 0 . Hence, the level of v, b is 1. Next, u, v is added to E 2 because u, t 0 , b, v is an avoiding path from u to b in G 1 and v, b is an honest path from v to b in G 1 . Hence, the level of u, v is 2. Finally, the edge a, u is added to E 3 and its level is 3. Note that a, u can be added to G * only after v, b and u, v are added to G * because we require that there is an honest path from either a or u to b.
Definition 7 (Confusing pairs). Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network and a, b ∈ V be a sender and receiver. A pair of sets
and at least one of the following holds:
There is an index i ∈ {0, 1} such that every path from
If Property (1) of Definition 7 holds and the adversary controls T i , then the Byzantine processors in T i can block the communication from a to b. However, if it does not hold, then for every index i ∈ {0, 1} there is a T i -avoiding path P i from a to b in G C . For every message M sent from a to b on both P 0 and P 1 , even if b does not know which of T 0 , T 1 is Byzantine, it can guess i with probability 
Theorem 1 ([1]). Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network and a, b ∈ V be a sender and receiver. For all
The following theorem connects fault-restricted reliable communication with reliable communication. As mentioned before, there is a transformation from [1] that executes the fault-restricted protocol for every pair of sets T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} and analyzes these executions to achieve reliable communication from a to b (see details in Sect. 6). Together with Theorem 1, this transformation gives an exact characterization when (t, )-reliable communication is possible:
partially authenticated network and a, b ∈ V be a sender and receiver. There is a (t, )-reliable communication protocol from a to b for every > 0 if and only if for every
T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} of size at most t it holds that (T 0 , T 1 ) is not an (a, b)-confusing pair.
The depth of edges
Beimel and Franklin [1] used the level of edges in order to bound the round complexity of the protocol. The contribution of this paper is a more efficient protocol, and it starts with introducing the notion of the depth of an edge. We use the depth of edges in order to bound the round complexity of the protocol. The depth of an edge is at most the level of an edge, but it can be significantly smaller. Moreover, the level of edges can be as much as Ω(n) even for t = 1, whereas the depth on an edge can be at most t. The depth of an edge of level j is the number of levels j ≤ j for which j is the first level that has an avoiding path to b from some vertex in precisely one of T 0 and T 1 . More formally,
Definition 8 (Depth of edges, paths, networks).
Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network, a, b ∈ V be a sender and receiver, and T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} be a pair of sets. We inductively define a sequence of sets
we define B j to be the set of all z ∈ T 0 ∆T 1 for which the following properties hold:
• For every 0 ≤ j < j it holds that z / ∈ B j , and
We denote depth(j) 
Finally, the depth of N is the maximal depth over all the edges in G * .
Note that the following three statements are equivalent: (1) e ∈ G C , (2) the level of e is 0, and (3) the depth of e is 0. Therefore, the depth of a path P is 0 if and only if P is in G C . For example, in the network N 2 described in Fig. 3 we have
Hence, all of the authentication edges are of depth 1 and the depth of N 2 is 1. We next bound the depth of a partially authenticated network.
Proof. Since G C is (t + 1, a, b)-connected, there are at least t + 1 vertex-disjoint paths from a to b in G C . Fix a set of such t + 1 paths. Since there is no honest path from a to b in G C , none of these paths is honest and there is at least one suspected vertex on each one of them (recall that a vertex v is suspected
Choose an avoiding path u = v0, v1, .
vertex vi executes SimpleSend(M, vi, vi+1). Endfor. if v ∈ T 0 ∪ T 1 ). We consider the last suspected vertex on each of these paths. Since from each of these suspected vertices there is a path to b that has no other suspected vertices on it, |B 1 | ≥ t + 1. Thus, there are at most 2t − (t + 1) = t − 1 additional sets B j for which B j = ∅, and the depth of N is as asserted.
Protocol SimpleSend
Protocol SimpleSend(M, u, v), described in Fig. 2 , transmits a message M on a path from u to v in G * . For every authentication edge u , v on the path from u to v it recursively calls SimpleSend(M, u , v ) to transmit the message on a path from u to v . We emphasize that Protocol SimpleSend(M, u, v) does not achieve reliable communication from u to v, it only chooses the paths on which the message is sent. It is a preliminary version of Protocol Send, discussed in Sect. 5. We will show that Send is efficient if SimpleSend is efficient, and then we will use Protocol Send as a sub-protocol of Protocol Transmit, our protocol for fault-restricted reliable communication.
The description of Protocol SimpleSend in Fig. 2 does not specify how an avoiding path is chosen. Such specification will be given in Sect. 4, after investigating the special structure of G * in Sect. 3. We next give intuition for possible implementations of Protocol SimpleSend and their analysis. As observed in [1] , since for every authentication edge u, v of level j in G * there is an avoiding path from u to v of level at most j − 1, transmitting a message on this path can be done by at most n transmissions on edges of level at most j − 1, yielding, by simple induction, a protocol with round complexity n O(n) . The first property that we introduce is of paths that end in b. We prove that for every authentication edge u, v there is a path from both u and v to b which has at most one edge of each level. Concatenating the path from u to b with the path from b to v results in an avoiding path from u to v that has at most two edges of each level, yielding, by simple induction, a protocol with round complexity 2 O(n) . Both approaches do not consider the impact of the number of Byzantine processors on the round complexity of the protocol. The main contribution of this paper is the concept of depth. When we send a message from u to b we choose a path from u to b for which the depth of authentication edges does
Vertex in T1
Vertex in T0 N2 Fig. 3 . An example demonstrating the choice of the paths in Protocol SimpleSend. The numbers indicate the level of authentication edges not increase as the path is traversed. We prove an upper bound on the round complexity of sending a message over an authentication edge that is exponential in the depth of the edge. Since the depth of an edge is at most t, the resulting protocol has round complexity n O(t) . We next present an example demonstrating the choice of the paths in Protocol SimpleSend.
Example 1.
Consider the partially authenticated network N 2 described in Fig. 3 in which T 0 = {t 0 , t 2 } and T 1 = {t 1 , t 3 }. Assume we want to send a message over the authentication edge a, u 1 . We can choose the avoiding paths on which we send messages in the following way: To send the message on a, u 1 , we use the T 1 -avoiding path a, t 0 , b, t 2 , u 2 , u 1 . This requires a recursive send on the authentication edge u 2 , u 1 . To send a message over u 2 , u 1 , we use the T 0 -avoiding path u 2 , u 3 , t 3 , b, t 1 , u 1 , which requires a recursive send on the authentication edge u 2 , u 3 . For the edge u 2 , u 3 we use the T 1 -avoiding path u 2 , t 2 , b, u 4 , u 3 which requires a recursive send on the authentication edge u 4 , u 3 . Finally, to send a message on u 4 , u 3 we use the T 0 -avoiding path u 4 , b, t 3 , u 3 which does not require any recursive calls.
Although this example may seem artificial, we show in Lemma 7 that every partially authenticated network has the structure of N 2 , and then we analyze the transmission costs in this structure. We show that these costs are exponential in the depth. The somewhat technical proofs in Sect. 3 provide the tools that enable the construction of such a structure.
The following lemma, which is used in Sect. 4, proves that the round complexity of transmitting M from u to v is equal to the round complexity of transmitting M from v to u for all u, v ∈ V . This implies that the round complexity of the protocol could be analyzed regardless of the direction in which M is sent.
Lemma 2. Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network. For all u, v ∈ V , if there is an implementation of the protocol SimpleSend(M, u, v) that terminates after rounds, then there is an implementation of SimpleSend(M, v, u) that terminates after rounds.
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on the depth of the recursive calls. The base case for paths in G C is trivial. For the induction step, let P u,v be the avoiding path chosen in the execution of SimpleSend (M, u, v) and note that the reverse path P v,u is an avoiding path as well. Using the induction hypothesis for the authentication edges u , v on P u,v , we conclude that Protocols SimpleSend(M, u , v ) and SimpleSend(M, v , u ) require the same number of rounds to terminate. Since Protocol SimpleSend(M, u, v) terminates after rounds, Protocol SimpleSend(M, v, u) terminates after rounds as well, and the induction follows.
The fact that Protocol SimpleSend is symmetric with respect to the sender and the receiver does not imply that reliable communication is symmetric with respect to the sender and the receiver. The reason is that the alert mechanism added in Protocol Transmit is not symmetric.
Properties of the graph G *
In this section we analyze the graph G * . In particular, we show that paths which end in b have additional properties. Our protocol utilizes this analysis to more efficiently transmit a message over an authentication edge. In this section we fix a partially authenticated network N = V, E C , E A , a sender a, a receiver b, and sets T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \{a, b} of suspected vertices. Thus, the graph G * is well defined.
Monotonous paths
The first property that we introduce is monotonous paths. Specifically, monotonous paths have only one authentication edge of each level. As explained before, monotonous paths imply a protocol with round complexity 2 O(n) .
Definition 9 (Monotonous paths).
Let P be a path in N . The path P is monotonous if for all authentication edges e 1 and e 2 in P , whenever e 2 precedes e 1 in the path P , level(e 2 ) is strictly larger then level(e 1 ).
For example, the path a, u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , b in N 2 (described in Fig. 3 ) is a monotonous path. Note that P being monotonous implies that the first authentication edge e on P has the highest level over all of the other edges in P . Hence, the level of P is determined by the level of this edge and vice versa. Also, if P is of level 0 (i.e., P is a path in G C ), then P is monotonous. Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on j. The base case for j = 0 follows from the observation that every path of level 0 is monotonous. For the induction step, assume that for every w ∈ V , if there is an honest path from w to b of level at most j − 1, then there is a monotonous honest path from w to b of level at most j − 1. Now, let P w,b be an honest path from w to b of level j. Since the level of P w,b is at least 1, there is at least one authentication edge on P w,b , and its level is at most j. Denote the first authentication edge on P w,b by e = u, v . If there is an honest path P u,b from u to b of level at most j − 1, then concatenating the prefix w, . . . , u of P w,b with P u,b yields an honest path w, . . . , u , P u,b from w to b of level at most j − 1, and, by the induction hypothesis, there is a monotonous honest path from w to b of level at most j − 1. Otherwise, by Property (3) in the definition of the graph G j , the level of e must be exactly j and there is an honest path from v to b with level at most j − 1. By the induction hypothesis there is a monotonous honest path P v,b from v to b of level at most j −1, which implies that the path w, . . . , u , u, v , P v,b is a monotonous honest path from v to b of level j, and the induction follows.
Left edges and left paths
We further introduce left edges. We also define the second property of paths that end in b, namely, left paths. Left paths are used in our implementation of Protocol SimpleSend, as they ensure paths with lower depth, resulting with an efficient implementation of Protocol SimpleSend. 
Definition 10 (Left and right edges and paths
An edge u, v is right if and only if v, u is left. A path P is left if every authentication edge on P is left.
For an illustration of a left edge see Fig. 4 , case (1). As another example, consider the authentication edge a, u 1 of level 4, shown in the graph N 2 (see Fig. 3 ). This edge is left since a, t 0 , b, t 2 , u 2 , u 1 is an avoiding path from a to u 1 with t 0 as its leftmost suspected vertex, and u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , b is an honest path from u 1 to b of level 3.
Definition 5 of the graph G * implies that there must be an honest path from either u or v to b of level at most j − 1, and an avoiding path P u,v from u to v of level at most j − 1. Property (2) in Definition 10 requires, in addition, that a suspected vertex must appear on P u,v before any authentication edges that are on P u,v . Informally, this vertex provides a shortcut path to b that enables sending messages more efficiently.
Lemma 4. Every authentication edge in G
* is either left or right.
Proof. Let e = u, v be an authentication edge of level j. We prove by induction on j that e is either left or right. For every edge of level 1, there is an avoiding path from u to v in G C . Observation 1 implies that there must be at least one suspected vertex on this path. If there is an honest path from v to b of level 0, then e is left. Otherwise, there is an honest path from u to b of level 0 and e is right.
Assume that every authentication edge of level at most j−1 is either left or right. The induction step for j is as follows. Let e = u, v be an edge of level j. If there is an avoiding path from u to v in G C , then similar arguments to those in the base case hold, and e is either left or right. Otherwise, let P be an avoiding path from u to v chosen with the minimal level among the avoiding paths from u to v. The path P must contain at least one authentication edge. Denote the level of P by j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ j − 1, and let e 1 = u 1 , v 1 and e 2 = u 2 , v 2 be the leftmost and rightmost authentication edges on P respectively (e 1 and e 2 can be the same edge). Denote P u1,b and P v2,b to be honest minimal-level paths from u 1 and v 2 to b respectively. Define
. . , v . Note that, for some i ∈ {0, 1}, the path P u,v is a T i -avoiding path from u to v of level at most j . Since P u1,b , P b,v2 is an honest path, if there is a suspected vertex on P u,v , then it can appear on u, . . . , u 1 or v 2 , . . . , v , but not on P u1,b , P b,v2 . There are three cases to consider (see Fig. 4) , and in each case we construct the paths proving that e is either left or right.
1. There are vertices t 1 , t 2 ∈ T i such that t 1 is a suspected vertex in u, . . . , u 1 , and t 2 is a suspected vertex in v 2 , . . . , v : Note that there is w ∈ {u, v} for which there is an honest path from w to b of level at most j − 1. If w = u, then e is right. Otherwise, w = v and e is left. See  Fig. 4, case (1 Thus, the induction follows.
The next lemma combines the property of monotonous paths with the property of left paths. Our protocol uses paths that are both monotonous and left to transmit messages efficiently.
Lemma 5. For every left authentication edge u, v of level j, there is a left, monotonous, honest path from v to b of level at most j − 1.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on j. Let e = u, v be a left authentication edge of level j ≥ 1. For the base case of the induction, the level of e is 1 and e is left. By Definition 10 there is an honest path from v to b of level 0. Since this path is in G C , it is left and monotonous as well.
Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for every authentication edge e of level at most j. For the induction step, let e = u, v be a left authentication edge of level j + 1. By Definition 10 there is an honest path from v to b of level at most j. Therefore, there is a minimal j ≤ j for which there is an honest path from v to b of level j . By Lemma 3, there is a monotonous, honest path P In the next lemma, we make the first link between depth and left edges. Proof. Let e = u, v be a left authentication edge of level j and depth d. Since e is left, there is an avoiding path P u,v from u to v of level at most j − 1 and there is an honest path P v,b from v to b of level at most j − 1. Hence, the path P u,v , P v,b is an avoiding path from u to b of level at most j − 1 and there is a leftmost suspected vertex z ∈ T i \ T i on this path for some i ∈ {0, 1}. This implies that there is also an avoiding path from z to b of level at most j − 1 and, since z / ∈ T 0 ∩ T 1 , the vertex z is in B k for some k ≤ j.
Note that the prefix u, . . . ,
, and we conclude that u, . . . , z , P z,b is an avoiding path from u to b of depth at most d − 1.
Efficient implementation of Protocol SimpleSend
In this section we utilize the properties of G * from Sect. 3 to describe an efficient implementation of Protocol SimpleSend. This implementation uses paths of depth d − 1 to send messages over edges of depth d, which motivates us to express transmission costs in terms of depth. Moreover, the depth of edges in N is at most t, and we prove that the running time of Protocol SimpleSend is n O(t) , which implies that the protocol is polynomial whenever the number of Byzantine processors is constant.
To specify an implementation for Protocol SimpleSend we specify how an avoiding path is chosen in each recursive call. That is, we describe how a message is sent over an authentication edge. This implementation, which is known to all of the processors in the network, completes the specification of the protocol. Hence, every processor in the network can execute its part of the protocol.
The following lemma proves an upper bound on the number of rounds required to send a message over an authentication edge of depth d + 1 by describing an implementation that achieves this bound. During the transmission of a message over an authentication edge of depth d + 1, this implementation sends the message over paths of depth d, which may be honest or avoiding. The notation cost(d) denotes the number of rounds required to send a message over a path of depth at most d in this implementation, taken as the maximum over the paths of depth at most d that are used by the protocol in this implementation. Since a path of depth 0 can have at most n edges, all of which are communication edges, we conclude that cost(0) ≤ n. Our next lemma is used to upper bound cost(d) as a function of cost(d − 1). As before, we fix a partially authenticated network N = V, E C , E A , a sender a, a receiver b, and sets T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} of suspected vertices. Thus, the graph G * is well defined. Consider the path P v,vm+1 . This path is also a left, monotonous, honest path from v to v m+1 . By Lemma 6 there is an avoiding path P u ,b from u to b of depth at most d − 1 for every 1 ≤ ≤ m + 1 (see Fig. 6 ). This implies that there is an avoiding path Consider the avoiding path from u to v:
Lemma 7. If u, v is a left authentication edge of depth d and P v,b is a left, monotonous, honest path from v to b with m authentication edges of depth d (and any number of authentication edges of a lower depth), then there is an implementation of SimpleSend(M, u, v) that terminates after at most
Since there are at most
Semi-honest path of depth at most d − 1.
Honest path of depth at most d − 1.
Authentication edge. 
rounds. Since this expression is less than 2(m + 2) · cost(d − 1) + (m + 1)n, the induction follows.
We further describe the implementation of Protocol SimpleSend from Lemma 7 to specify how a message is sent on a path of depth d. Although this path can be either honest or avoiding, we treat it as an avoiding path, because an honest path is also an avoiding path. The following lemma describes how these paths are chosen and upper bounds cost 
Lemma 8. There is an implementation of Protocol
Proof. We prove the upper bound by induction on d. For the base case, any path of depth 0 is a path in G C , which implies that cost(0) ≤ n and the inequality holds. Assume the induction hypothesis holds for every d < d. For the induction step, let P be an avoiding path from w to b, chosen with a minimal level over these paths, and denote depth(P ) = d and level(P ) = j. Since d ≥ 1, there is at least one authentication edge on P . Let u, v be the leftmost authentication edge on P , and let w, . . . , u be a prefix of P in G C . If u, v is right, then there is an honest path P from u to b of level at most j − 1, which implies that w, . . . , u , P is an avoiding path from w to b of level at most j − 1, a contradiction to the choice of P with a minimal level. Therefore, u, v is left, and by Lemma 5 there is a monotonous, honest path P v,b from v to b of depth d and level at most j − 1.
Consider the avoiding path For 
The inequality in (1) is implied by the induction hypothesis.
We have specified how Protocol SimpleSend sends a message over an authentication edge, and how honest and avoiding paths are chosen. This implementation is well defined, which implies that cost(d) is well defined. We use these results to upper bound the round complexity of a message transmission from a to b on an honest path.
Lemma 9.
There is an implementation of SimpleSend that terminates after at most n 2 · 2n t 2t rounds.
Proof. If there is an honest path from a to b in G C , then SimpleSend(M, a, b) terminates after at most n rounds. Otherwise, by Lemma 1 the depth of G * is at most t, which implies, by Lemma 8, that there is an implementation of SimpleSend(M, a, b) that transmits M over an honest path from a to b and terminates after at most cost(t) ≤ (t + 1) · n t k=0 (δ k + 1) 2 rounds. Let j be the highest level of an edge in G * , and notice that δ 0 + δ 1 + . . . + δ t = j and that j ≤ n. Also,
2 is maximal when
Finally, since t ≤ n − 2, we conclude that:
.
Fault-restricted reliable communication
In this section we present Protocol Send, which is an extended version of Protocol SimpleSend, and we explain why the two protocols have the same round complexity. We also introduce Protocol Transmit which solves the problem of fault-restricted reliable communication by executing Protocol Send, and we prove that its round complexity is at most n + 1 times the round complexity of Protocol Send. Protocol Transmit borrows ideas from Protocol Transmit of [1] ; however, our protocol is simpler and has lower message complexity. In Sect. 6 we use this protocol to obtain a protocol that solves the problem of (t, )-reliable communication.
We first describe Protocol Send and then we explain how Protocol Transmit uses it to achieve fault-restricted reliable communication. Protocol Send(M, P ), described in Fig. 7 , transmits a message M on a path P . The message M is propagated in the same fashion as in Protocol SimpleSend: if u, v is a communication edge, then u simply propagates M to v. Otherwise, u, v is an authentication edge, u uses the shared key k u,v to authenticate M , and the authenticated message is sent to v by calling Send recursively. If v does not receive a valid authenticated message from u (at the appropriate time), it recalls this fact by setting a flag which is later sent to b in Protocol Transmit. Thus, Protocol Send does not give any reliability guarantees, but the flags that it maintains are used for reporting to b which of T 0 , T 1 is Byzantine.
Protocol Send uses fixed paths that are known to all of the processors in the network. That is, these paths are explicitly specified by Protocol Send. Let u, v be an authentication edge of level j. To send a message from u to v, the protocol fixes an avoiding path path(u, v) from u to v. The only requirement for path(u, v) is that its level is at most j − 1. For every w ∈ V with an honest path from w to b, to send a message from w to b the protocol fixes an honest path path to b(w) from w to b. The only requirement for path to b(w) is that it is a monotonous honest path, whose level is minimal over these paths. Under these requirements, the correctness of the protocol is proved.
By Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, the paths chosen by Protocol SimpleSend satisfy the requirements for the paths fixed by Protocol Send. Authenticating messages and maintaining a flag do not change the round complexity of Protocol Send with respect to Protocol SimpleSend. Hence, the round complexity of Protocol Send equals the round complexity of Protocol SimpleSend.
Protocol Transmit(M, a, b), described in Fig. 8 , reliably transmits a message M from a to b. This protocol proceeds in cycles: in the first cycle M is sent from a to b on three paths: P 0 , P 1 , and P . The paths P 0 and P 1 are paths from a to b in the communication graph that avoid T 0 and T 1 respectively, and M is propagated on these paths from a to b. The path P is a T 0 ∪ T 1 -avoiding path in G * . The message M is propagated from a to b on P by executing the recursive Protocol Send(M ,P ). Once this execution terminates, if M arrives on P , then b accepts it. Otherwise, we prove in Lemma 11 that b can analyze the execution of Transmit (M, a, b) and determine an index i ∈ {0, 1} for which T i is Byzantine. This enables b to conclude that P i is Byzantine-free, therefore it accepts the message which arrives on P i .
In the first cycle of Protocol Transmit, Protocol Send(M, P ) is executed and then alert calls are invoked. These calls, executed in parallel in the second cycle, send the flag values to b. Alert calls are recursive calls to Protocol Send, and they may trigger additional cycles. However, if (and only if) all of the alert calls that are executed in a cycle send messages over paths in G C , then no additional cycle of alert calls is executed, and Protocol Transmit terminates. In Lemma 10 we show that such a cycle exists.
The following lemma proves that the round complexity of Transmit is at most n + 1 times the round complexity of SimpleSend. As before, we fix a partially authenticated network N = V, E C , E A , a sender a, a receiver b, and sets T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} of suspected vertices. Thus, the graph G * is well defined.
Lemma 10. If there is an implementation of Protocol
SimpleSend(M, w, b) that terminates after at most τ rounds for every w ∈ V , then there is an implementation of Protocol Transmit(M, w, b) that terminates after at most τ · (n + 1) rounds for every w ∈ V .
Proof. In every cycle of Protocol Transmit, there are parallel executions of Protocol Send. If an authentication edge participates in an execution of Protocol Send, then alert calls are invoked and another cycle is executed.
To show that the execution of Transmit(M, w, b) terminates after at most n + 1 cycles, we show that sending a message to b on a path of level j using Protocol Send may only trigger executions of Protocol Send in which alerts are sent to b on paths of level at most j − 1. Since the level of the paths on which alerts are transmitted decreases from one cycle to another, a cycle is eventually reached in which no authentication edges are used and no alerts are invoked; hence Protocol Transmit terminates.
Consider the execution of Send(M, P ) and let j = level(P ). We show that level(path to b(z)) < j for any execution of Send(M, path to b(z)) in the next cycle. For every authentication edge u, v of level i that participates in Protocol Send(M, P ), the protocol fixes the path path(u, v) from u to v of level at most i−1 to propagate the message from u to v. Moreover, by the construction of G * there is an honest path of level at most i from both u and v to b. From Lemma 3 it follows that for every authentication edge u, v of level i there is a monotonous honest path from w to b of level at most i. Hence, authentication edges of levels i ≤ j −1 that participate in the execution of Send(M, P ) trigger alert calls on paths of level at most j − 1. Moreover, since P is a monotonous path, only the first edge on this path, denoted u 1 , v 1 , is of level j, and the suffix of P is an honest monotonous path from v 1 to b of level at most j − 1. This implies that the alert call invoked by v 1 is on a path of level at most j − 1. We conclude that authentication edges that participate in the transmission of a message from w to b on a path of level j trigger alert calls on paths of level at most j − 1.
Therefore, if level(path to b(w)) = j, then in cycle 1 of Transmit(M, w, b) there are alert transmissions on paths of level at most j − 1. Repeating this argument we conclude that in cycle at most j + 1, there are alert transmissions on paths of level 0. That is, alert messages are sent to b on paths in the communication graph, which implies that no authentication edges participate in this cycle. Since there are at most n + 1 cycles, each of which requires at most τ rounds to terminate, Protocol Transmit(M, w, b) terminates after at most τ ·(n+ 1) rounds.
The next lemma is used to prove the correctness of the protocol. We say that an authentication edge u, v is honest during an execution of a protocol if both u and v are honest. Proof. Let P be the honest path from w to b fixed by Protocol Transmit. Since P is Byzantine-free, if P is in G C then clearly b accepts M . Otherwise, authentication edges on P trigger a second cycle in which alert calls are transmitted. In particular, for every authentication edge u, v on P , the message M is propagated by v if and only if it arrives with valid authentication. Otherwise, the "error" message is propagated. Note that it is impossible that v accepts a message that was not sent by u because we assume that the adversary has not forged any authenticated messages that were sent from u to v (since both u and v are honest). Hence, if b accepts a message M = "error", then it must be that M = M . If b receives "error", it infers that there is at least one authentication edge that participated in the protocol for which a message sent from one end of this edge was not received with valid authentication on its other end. The rest of the proof shows that b can find an authentication edge from which it can determine a set that contains all Byzantine vertices.
The execution of Transmit(M, w, b) proceeds in cycles. Alert transmissions are invoked at the end of each cycle, and executed in the next cycle. For every FLAG u,v sent from v to b, since the alert message contains the cycle number, u and v, no two alert messages are identical. As before, if b receives a message FLAG u,v where either FLAG u,v = TRUE or FLAG u,v = FALSE, then it must be that FLAG u,v = FLAG u,v . We say that a cycle is successful if, at the end of the cycle, b correctly receives all of the messages that were sent to it during the cycle. Since messages in the last cycle are sent over honest paths in G C , vertex b receives all of these messages, which implies that there is at least one successful cycle.
Consider the first successful cycle and denote it by C. This cycle cannot be the first because M = "error". Also, if all of the flag values received by b in cycle C are TRUE, then v has received a valid authenticated message from u for every authentication edge u, v that participated in the previous cycle. This implies that the cycle preceding C is successful; a contradiction to the choice of C. Therefore, b receives all of the flags that are sent to it in C and at least one of these flags has a false value.
Let u, v be an authentication edge that participates in cycle C for which b receives FLAG u,v = FALSE, chosen with the minimal level over these edges. This implies that there was a round in which v did not receive a valid authenticated message from u. Recall that to send a message from u to v the protocol fixes an avoiding path path(u, v) from u to v, which is known to all of the processors. By the choice of C, when this cycle ends, b receives FLAG u ,v for every authentication edge u , v on the avoiding path path(u, v). Moreover, for every authentication edge u , v on the avoiding path path(u, v), since level( u , v ) < level ( u, v ) , by the choice of u, v it must be that FLAG u ,v = TRUE. Since b knows that v did not receive a message with valid authentication from u, and that v received a valid authenticated message from u for every authentication edge u , v on the avoiding path path(u, v), the receiver b can conclude that there is a Byzantine processor on path(u, v). Finally, path(u, v) is a T i -avoiding path for some i ∈ {0, 1} and b detects that T i contains all Byzantine vertices.
The next theorem proves that Protocol Transmit achieves ({T 0 , T 1 } , )-reliable communication from a to b if authentication edges that participate in its execution use an ( , ·n 2 )-authentication scheme, for = 2n 3 · 2n t 2t .
By [16] , this can be achieved if authentication keys of length O( (n + log 1 ) + log |M |) are used. Assume that during an execution of Transmit, the adversary has not forged any authenticated messages that were sent on honest edges. Thus, by Lemma 11, either b learns M or b detects that T i is Byzantine for some i ∈ {0, 1}, in which case b accepts the message which arrives on P i . Since in both cases b learns M , we only need to show that the probability that the adversary has forged at least one authenticated message during the execution of Transmit (M, a, b) is at most . The number of times that an authentication key is used, taken as the maximum over all of the authentication keys, is at most = 2n 3 · 2n t 2t (the number of rounds in the protocol).
Hence, for every authentication edge u, v that participates in the execution of Send(M, P ), there are at most transmissions between u and v, and for each of these, the probability that one of the processors accepts a message that was not sent by the other one is at most ·n 2 . Since there are at most n 2 such edges, and since there are at most transmissions on each such edge, the probability that the adversary forges an authentication of a message sent on an honest edge is at most · n 2 · ·n 2 = .
Reliable communication
In this section we employ a transformation from [1] executions. However, there is a set T of size t that contains all Byzantine processors, and if for every T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} of size t, the adversary has not forged any valid authentication on a messages sent on an honest edges, during the execution of Transmit (M, a, b) for (T, T 1 ) , then, by Lemma 11, in each of these We only need to show that the probability that the adversary has forged any valid authentication of a message that was sent on an honest edge during the , there are at most transmissions between u and v, and for each of these, the probability that one of the processors accepted a message that was not sent by the other one is at most /( n t · · n 2 ). Since there are at most n 2 such edges, and since there are at most transmissions on each such edge, the probability that the adversary has forged at least one authenticated message in at least one of the n t executions is at most
The next corollary proves that the protocol presented in Theorem 4 has polynomial round complexity and polynomial message complexity if t is constant.
In addition, if private communication from a to b is possible, then a can use the protocol of [12, 1] for private communication to privately transmit a key to b. Once a and b share a secret key, further private communication between a and b is efficient. That is, once a and b share a private key, b can privately send a message to a by first encrypting and authenticating the message and then sending it to a on t + 1 vertex-disjoint paths in the communication graph. Since one of the encrypted and authenticated messages must arrive at a on at least one of the communication paths, a can verify its authenticity, decrypt it, and retrieve the original message from b.
Is reliable communication symmetric?
In this section we give a simple characterization of reliable communication in the presence of one Byzantine processor and show that (1, )-reliable communication is symmetric. Furthermore, we show that these results do not apply for t ≥ 2.
Characterizing reliable communication with one Byzantine processor
In this section, we consider (1, )-reliable communication. We prove that if G C is connected, then a simple necessary and sufficient condition for (1, )-reliable communication is that the communication graph G C is (2, a, b) -connected, and that
Lemma 12.
Let N = V, E C , E A be a partially authenticated network and a, b ∈ V be a pair of vertices. If G C is connected and (2, a, b)-connected, and G 
Proof. Fix any t 0 , t 1 ∈ V \ {a, b}. If there is a path in G C that avoids {t 0 , t 1 }, then by Property (1) of Definition 7 the pair ({t 0 } , {t 1 }) is not an (a, b)-confusing pair. Otherwise, every path from a to b in G C has a suspected vertex, t 0 or t 1 , on it. Since G C is (2, a, b) -connected, there are two vertexdisjoint paths from a to b in G C , and there must be exactly one suspected vertex on each of these paths. Hence, there is a path P t0,b from t 0 to b that avoids t 1 and there is a path P t1,b from t 1 to b that avoids t 0 . Also, G C is connected and for every u ∈ V there is a path P u,b from u to b. If P u,b is not honest, then there is an index i ∈ {0, 1} such that the prefix u, . . . , t i of P u,b avoids t i and u, . . . , t i , P ti,b is an avoiding path from u to b. We conclude that for every u ∈ V there is an avoiding path P u,b from u to b.
Since G is (3, a, b) -connected, there is a path P from a to b in G that avoids {t 0 , t 1 }. We will prove that P is also a path in G * , which implies by Definition 7 that ({t 0 } , {t 1 }) is not an (a, b)-confusing pair. Assume towards a contradiction that P is not in G * . Hence, there is an authentication edge e = u, v and an honest path P such that u, v , P is a suffix of P , the edge e is not in E * , and P is in E * . We next check when e ∈ E * according to Definition 5 of G * . Since P avoids {t 0 , t 1 }, the vertices u, v are not in {t 0 , t 1 } and Property (1) holds. Since there is an avoiding path P u,b from u to b, the path P u,b , P is an avoiding path from u to v and, therefore, Property (2) holds. Finally, the path P is an honest path from v to b and Property (3) holds. Hence, e ∈ E * ; a contradiction. Thus, P is in G * and On the other hand, if the condition that the communication graph G C is (2, a, b)-connected and G is (3, a, b) -connected does not hold, then there is a confusing pair in G , which implies by Theorem 2 that (t, )-reliable communication is not possible for every < 
Reliable communication is not symmetric for t ≥ 2
In this section we show that the simple characterization for the case t = 1 cannot be applied to the case t ≥ 2. Moreover, we show that if t ≥ 2, then (t, )-reliable communication for every > 0 is not symmetric.
Lemma 13. For every t ≥ 2, there is a partially authenticated network
Proof. Consider the partially authenticated network N 3 described in Fig. 9 . . . Fig. 9 . The partially authenticated network N3
. . . in N 3 . Thus, by Property (2) of Definition 5, the graph G * does not contain any authentication edges. Since G * is the communication graph G C , and since there is no honest path from a to b in G * , by Definition 7 of a confusing pair, the pair (T 0 , T 1 ) is a confusing pair in N 3 . This implies that (t, )-reliable communication from a to b in N 3 is impossible for every < Beimel and Franklin [1] showed an example where faultrestricted reliable communication is possible from a to b, but is impossible from b to a. However, in their example (t, )-reliable communication for every > 0 is impossible in both directions. We present a stronger example in which (t, )-reliable communication from a to b is possible for every > 0, but impossible from b to a for every < is an avoiding path from u 3 to b in G 0 , and u 3 , b ∈ E 1 . Furthermore, the path u 4 , v 1 , u 3 is an avoiding path from u 4 to u 3 in G 1 and there is an honest path u 3 , b from u 3 to b in G 1 , and u 4 , u 3 ∈ E 2 . Finally, the path u 4 4 , v 1 is a suspected vertex. Hence, either P 1 or P 2 is an honest path. Assume, without loss of generality, that P 1 is an honest path. Since v 2 / ∈ T 0 ∩ T 1 , the path u 3 , v 2 , b is an avoiding path from u 3 to b in G C , and u 3 , b ∈ E 1 . Since v 1 / ∈ T 0 ∩ T 1 (otherwise, |T 0 | + |T 1 | > 2t), the path u 4 , v 1 , u 3 is an avoiding path from u 4 to u 3 . Also, there is an honest path u 3 , b from u 3 to b in G 2 , and therefore u 4 , u 3 ∈ E 2 . Finally, in G 2 the path u 4 , u 3 , b, v 2 , a is an avoiding path from u 4 to a and there is an honest path u 4 , u 3 , b from u 4 to b, which implies that u 4 , a ∈ E 3 . Hence, P 1 is an honest path from a to b in G * , and therefore (T 0 , T 1 ) is not an (a, b)-confusing pair.
We conclude that for every T 0 , T 1 ⊆ V \ {a, b} of size t there is an honest path from a to b in G * , which implies by Theorem 2 that (t, )-reliable communication from a to b is possible for every > 0.
We show that (t, )-reliable communication from b to a is impossible for < 4 to a in G 0 and a, u 4 / ∈ E 1 . Symmetric arguments imply that a, u 2 / ∈ E 1 . Moreover, any other authentication edge is not added to E 1 since there is no honest path from any of its endpoints to a. To conclude, there is no honest path from b to a in G * , and (T 0 , T 1 ) is a (b, a)-confusing pair in G * , which, by Theorem 2, implies that (t, )-reliable communication from b to a is impossible for every < 1 2 . This asymmetry result is somewhat surprising because both communication and authentication edges are symmetric. The asymmetry stems from the topology of G, which can be asymmetric with respect to a and b. Recall that constructing G * when the sender is a, and the receiver is b requires honest paths to b, while constructing G * when the sender is b and the receiver is a requires honest paths to a, resulting, in general, in two different graphs.
Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we considered reliable message transmission between a pair of processors in partially authenticated, synchronous networks -that is, networks where some processors are connected by communication channels and some pairs of processors share authentication keys. Beimel and Franklin [1] characterize the partially authenticated networks where a can reliably transmit a message to b. Our main result is a more efficient protocol than the protocol of [1] . The complexity of our protocol is (n/t) O(t) , where n is the number of processors in the network and t is an upper bound on the number of Byzantine processors in the network. Specifically, our protocol is polynomial when the number of Byzantine processors is O (1) , and for every t its round complexity is bounded by 2 O(n) . The same improvements hold for reliable and private communication.
We also give a simple characterization for reliable communication against one Byzantine processor and show that reliable communication is symmetric for t = 1. On the other hand, we show that reliable communication is not symmetric for t ≥ 2. That is, there is a partially authenticated network (i.e., a combination of a communication graph and an authentication graph) for which reliable communication is possible from a to b, but is not possible from b to a. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive as the edges are bi-directional.
The main open problem raised by our work is whether for every number t of Byzantine processors, (t, )-reliable communication from a to b implies efficient (t, )-reliable communication from a to b, Open Problem 1. Let N be a partially authenticated network with n processors, a be a sender, b be a receiver, and t be an integer. Assume that a can (t, )-reliably transmit a message to b. In this setting, is there a (t, )-reliable protocol whose round complexity and message complexity are polynomial in n?
Our protocol, as well as the protocol of [1] , assume that the network is synchronous. That is, a protocol proceeds in rounds; at the end of each round a processor knows if it has not received messages from another processor. In addition, every processor in the network knows when a starts to transmit a message to b. The question is whether these assumptions are necessary. There are some networks where asynchronous message transmission is possible, for example, in a network where the communication graph is (t + 1)-connected and the union of the communication and authentication graphs is (2t+  1, a, b) 
